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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






DOM WADHWA, MD, 




SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-02777) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 11, 2017 
 
Before: RESTREPO, SCIRICA and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 







 Dom Wadhwa, M.D., appeals pro se from orders of the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey, granting the defendant’s motions for summary 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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judgment in this action brought pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 
U.S.C. § 552.  For the following reasons, we will affirm.  
 In 2015, Wadhwa submitted a FOIA request to the Philadelphia Veterans Affairs 
Medical Center (VA), seeking documents pertaining to complaints of employment 
discrimination.  For instance, Wadhwa’s requested documents pertaining to 
discrimination complaints filed in the VA Office of Employment Discrimination 
Complaint Adjudication (OEDCA).  Notably, Wadhwa specifically requested documents 
that OEDCA “reviewed” and “considered” in “support” of its conclusions.  He also 
sought material concerning individual VA employees who were disciplined for 
discriminatory practices.  After conducting a search for responsive records among various 
agency components, the VA responded by disclosing in full a final agency decision, 
releasing some documents with partial redactions under FOIA Exemption 6, withholding 
other material in full citing FOIA Exemptions 5, 6, and 7(C), and refusing to confirm or 
deny the existence of disciplinary records concerning specific employees.   
 Unsatisfied with the VA’s responses, Wadhwa filed a complaint in the District 
Court.  The VA filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District Court granted 
in part and denied in part.  In particular, the District Court concluded that the VA had 
demonstrated that its search for responsive documents was adequate, but held that it 
failed to adequately justify its use of FOIA Exemptions and its refusal to confirm or deny 
the existence of some employee disciplinary records.  As to those records, the District 
Court granted Wadhwa’s “Motion to Compel Discovery.”  Thereafter, the VA filed 
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another motion for summary judgment.  The District Court granted that motion and 
vacated its order granting the “Motion to Compel Discovery,” stating that new 
declarations from agency personnel sufficiently justified the agency’s FOIA responses.  
Wadhwa appealed.1   
 We employ a two-tiered test in reviewing an order granting summary judgment in 
proceedings seeking disclosure under the FOIA.  First, we must “decide whether the 
district court had an adequate factual basis for its determination[;]” and, second, we must 
“decide whether that determination was clearly erroneous.”  Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 488 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotations, citations omitted).  We 
will reverse only “if the findings are unsupported by substantial evidence, lack adequate 
evidentiary support in the record, are against the clear weight of the evidence[,] or where 
the district court has misapprehended the weight of the evidence.”  Lame v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 767 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1985).  Summary judgment may be granted on the basis 
of agency declarations if they are specific and detailed, and if there is no contradictory 
evidence on the record or evidence of agency bad faith.  See Manna v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 51 F.3d 1158, 1162-64 (3d Cir. 1995).  We may affirm the District Court’s 
judgment on any basis supported by the record.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 
247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
                                              
1 Wadhwa also filed a timely motion for reconsideration, arguing that the VA’s FOIA 
responses denied him “fundamental fairness of due process.”  We conclude that the 
District Court properly denied Wadhwa’s motion because his disagreement with the 
District Court’s analysis did not provide a basis for reconsideration.  See Max’s Seafood 
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 Exemption 5 protects from disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency 
memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party ... in litigation with 
the agency.”  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).  The Exemption encompasses the traditional 
discovery privileges, including the deliberative process privilege, which “protects agency 
documents that are both predecisional and deliberative.”  Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FDA, 
449 F.3d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  Here, the VA explained that it used Exemption 5 to 
withhold a draft final agency decision, as well as “e-mails, letters, and other documents 
from and between staff members” of the OEDCA and the Office of Resolution 
Management.  According to the VA, this material was generated within the agency as 
part of a “deliberative, pre-decisional process.”  This description provided a sufficient 
factual basis for the District Court’s determination that the agency properly invoked 
Exemption 5, and we hold that the District Court’s conclusion was not clearly erroneous.  
Indeed, draft reports and internal communications generated as part of agency 
decisionmaking may be properly withheld pursuant to Exemption 5.  See Abdelfattah, 
488 F.3d at 183 (protecting draft ICE incident report); see also Dep’t of Interior v. 
Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2001) (“The deliberative process 
privilege rests on the obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly 
among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news, 
and its object is to enhance the quality of agency decisions by protecting open and frank 
                                                                                                                                                  
Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).   
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discussion among those who make them within the Government.” (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)). 
 The VA also properly withheld material under Exemption 6.2  Exemption 6 
protects from disclosure “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of 
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”  5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(6).  Here, the VA withheld names, phone numbers, email addresses, and other 
identifying information concerning individuals, including complainants and witnesses, 
who were involved in adjudications of discrimination complaints.3  In addition, the VA 
cited Exemption 6 in withholding individuals’ financial information, such as bank 
account numbers, deposit slips, copies of cleared checks, and pay statements.  This 
information implicates more than de minimis privacy interests, see Nat’l Ass’n of Retired 
Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1989), and Wadhwa has failed to 
identify any public interest in disclosure, see Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local 
Union No. 19 v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 135 F.3d 891, 897 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(recognizing that the only relevant public interest in disclosure is the extent to which 
                                              
2 The VA also relied on Exemption 7(C), which permits the withholding of “records or 
information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the 
production of such law enforcement records ... could reasonably be expected to constitute 
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).  We need not 
address whether the responsive documents were compiled for law enforcement purposes 
because, as explained below, the VA properly withheld personally identifying 
information even under the narrower withholding standard of Exemption 6.  See 
McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1254 (3d Cir. 1993). 
  
3 We note that the VA disclosed the identities of “top leadership of the medical center,” 
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disclosure would serve the core purpose of the FOIA, which is contributing significantly 
to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government); Carpenter v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 470 F.3d 434, 441 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating that there “is no public 
interest in supplementing an individual’s request for discovery.”).  Therefore, in the 
absence of any public interest in disclosure, the District Court properly held that the VA’s 
invocation of Exemption 6 was proper.  See Horner, 879 F.2d at 879 (observing that 
“something, even a modest privacy interest, outweighs nothing every time.”).   
 The VA also properly refused to confirm or deny the existence of employee 
disciplinary records.  This so-called “Glomar response” is an “exception to the general 
rule that agencies must acknowledge the existence of information responsive to a FOIA 
request and provide specific, non-conclusory justifications for withholding that 
information[.]”  Roth v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 642 F.3d 1161, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  
The response is permitted only when “to answer the FOIA inquiry would cause harm 
cognizable under” an applicable statutory exemption.  Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374 
(D.C. Cir. 2007).  The agency must demonstrate that acknowledging the mere existence 
of responsive records would disclose exempt information.  Id.  Here, Wadhwa requested 
records concerning the “removal” of two VA doctors.  He also sought “documents used 
as evidence in … any … disciplinary action cited as Title VII violation … that resulted in 
posting of ‘Notice to employees’ by Mr. Devansky, on December 2, 2014[,]” as well as 
records “of all the steps taken by management officials … to remedy the discrimination 
                                                                                                                                                  
such as the director, acting directors, acting associate directors, and chief of staff.  
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….”4  Given Wadhwa’s failure to identify any public interest in disclosure, even 
acknowledging the existence of misconduct or disciplinary records here would cause an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.  See Beck v. Dep’t of Justice, 997 F.2d 1489, 
1492-94 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (affirming Glomar response to request for records concerning 
misconduct by DEA agents).   
 In his brief, Wadhwa complains that the VA did not prepare a Vaughn index5 and 
that the District Court did not conduct an in camera inspection of the withheld records.  
Although the VA did not submit a document labeled a Vaughn index, it did provide 
detailed declarations from agency employees that described the withheld information and 
the statutory basis for nondisclosure.  The declarations were sufficiently detailed, and 
Wadhwa has not adequately demonstrated why in camera review was required.  See 
Hinton v. Dep’t of Justice, 844 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that there “is no set 
formula for a Vaughn Index”); Loving v. Dep’t of Def., 550 F.3d 32, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
                                              
4 Although this request appears to broadly seek documents used in employee disciplinary 
proceedings, the VA explained that it necessarily refers to a specific employee.  
According to the VA, the “Notice of employees” “is not merely a general notice … of 
Agency policy … [but] is a notice required in response to a finding of discrimination on a 
specific case, pertaining to a specific individual.”  That individual can be identified by 
name and date included in the request.   
 
5 A Vaughn index is a document prepared by the agency that identifies each document 
withheld, the statutory exemption claimed, and a particularized description of how each 
document withheld falls within a statutory exemption.  Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t 
of Energy, 644 F.2d 969, 984 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 
(D.C. Cir. 1973).   
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(noting that district courts have broad discretion to decide if in camera review is 
necessary).    
 For the reasons given, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
